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Abstract: This article has aimed to open a discussion on the rethinking a neo authoritarian media 
system in the age of neo liberalism as a case of Turkey’s media experiences. In this context, this study 
deals with the media policy paradigm shift in the Republic of Turkey since 1980s. According to a 
recent report of the European Journalism Centre (2010:4); although in the wake of a recent 
democratization wave in the country, there have been some positive elements in the media such as 
sporadic emergence of some critical perspectives even in some notoriously biased media outlets, 
which may change this bleak picture, the structural factors which shape the media practices 
(ownership concentration, working conditions of the journalist, etc) are too rigid and therefore it is 
too early to become optimistic. In this context, some aspects of these democratization processes are 
taken from the candidacy of European Union. Despite these positive developments in the doorstep of 
the European Union, Turkey’s media experience is heavily based on ownership structure and 
journalistic routines are far away from the democratic media system. Therefore, Turkey’s media 
experiences are characterised as a sample of neo authoritarian media system with ongoing media 
policy transformations, for instance privatization of media companies as much as possible, breaking 
monopolies and the fundamental change of the public broadcasting service is in the context of media 
policy. This observable change depends on the two overlapping development in Turkey’s democracy. 
On the one hand, the landscape of national media spaces has been affected by the political and 
economical conditions; especially after the two financial crashes (in 2000 and 2001) Turkey’s media 
has followed a re-structure by means of ownership and control. On the other hand, Turkey’s media 
experiences have been affected by governmental changes. Before the economic crises Turkey’s 
democracy was governed by a coalition and after the economic crises Turkey’s government changed 
by the national elections in 2002. Thus this article seeks to answer two interrelated questions: Where 
does press freedom stand in Turkey decades after the Justice and Development Party’s policies 
began? And what does Turkey’s media transformation tell us about our understanding of mass 
political media systems? In this study by using comparative analysis, and incorporating political 
science literature that offers typologies of non democratic systems of governance, this article 
demonstrates that contemporary Turkey’s media find much in common with authoritarian regimes 
across the world and are not sui generis as some have argued.  
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Introduction  
This article examines, by means of a case study, media policy paradigm shift in 
Turkey and in this context, rethinking neo authoritarian media systems in the age of 
neo liberalism. The article has focused on the recent trends in media ownership in 
Turkey and their impact on media pluralism and journalistic autonomy in the 
context of media policy paradigm shift in Turkey since 1980s. Therefore, this study 
analysis focuses mainly on the ever-intensifying processes of ownership 
concentration and its reflections on the media world in Turkey. In this context, the 
article investigates both the allegations and the growing evidence of political and 
business instrumentalization 1 of the media in the hands of cross media giants in 
Turkey. I argue that this kind of coupling of business, media, and political sectors 
constitutes an ever more prominent feature of the national media spaces in Turkey 
and can be regarded as an indicator of its gradual “Italianization”2 of the Turkish 
media practices. 
The landscape of Turkish media has been rapidly undergone “social”, “economic” 
and “political” transformations since 1980s. These ongoing “changes” have two 
faces. On the one hand; “privatization of public communication companies”, 
“liberalization of the media market” and “deregulation / re - regulation” 
imperatives came into being on the media sector since 1980s. In this context, 
despite very significant rise in the number of media outlets, the level of ownership 
is high in both the national newspaper and television markets, and has increased 
during the last three decades. Moreover, cross ownership has emerged as a major 
problem on the freedom of the press. On the other hand, Turkish national media 
spaces faced a serious threat on the freedom of the expression, especially since 
2002. The national media space of Turkey is almost collided with the pressure of 
                                                          
1
 Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004, p. 37) use the concept of instrumentalization to describe 
“the control of the media by outside actors–parties, politicians, social groups, or economic actors 
seeking political influence, who use them to intervene in the world of politics”. However, the authors 
quickly add that the media “can also be ‘instrumentalized’ for commercial purposes,” opening the 
door for a broader understanding of this concept, which was also adopted in this study. In this study, 
media insturmentalization is understood as a form of control exercised over the media in order to 
achieve particular economic and /or political goals. 
2
 In the early 1990’s, Slavko Splichal (1994, pp. 145-146) writing primarily about East Central 
Europe, discussed the “Italianization” of the media. However, in this context he was referring more to 
the politization of media and the integration of media and political elites, as opposed to the 
dominance of the media by one person or political coalition. Thus, the comparison with Turkey is not 
as salient. In the Turkey’s national media sphere this term, “Italianization”, called “yandaş medya”. 
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government at that time. Since the country became a candidate of the EU in 1999, 
Turkish democratic rights in general, and freedom of expression in particular, have 
occupied a great deal of political media space both in Turkey and abroad. 
Internationally, discussions concerning the limits of media pluralism, tolerance of 
ethnic/cultural diversity, the structural changes of media ownership and freedom of 
expression in Turkey often centre on questions related with state censorship and 
legislative constraints. Moreover, these debates have intensified after the election 
of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in November 2002. Although an 
intensive period of parliamentary reforms geared toward conforming to the 
pluralistic and democratic ideals of the European Union began 1, in practice, major 
hurdles that limit democratic rights and attacks on freedom of expression persisted 
(Christensen, 2010, pp. 177-178). In this context, the financial crises and then as a 
result of the general elections in 2002 and with the change of the government, 
media’s role and the functions have been re-defined. Although, Justice and 
Development Party’s official self definition is a “conservative democrat”, the 
founder of the Party has originated from the Islamist ideology and movement of 
Islamic political thought. In this respect this is the resurgence of the old but 
important political conflict(s) in the political scene of Turkey. This conflict is 
between “Islamist” versus “Modernist” or say to “Kemalist” political thought. 
Although, the political tensions have been centralised between Islamist and 
Kemalist political thought since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 
1923, these political tensions, which is to be the case, never polarized in the history 
of Republic of Turkey. On the other hand, that conflict is between the government 
and the secular media structure in Turkey. Especially this conflict has been seen as 
the government pressures on the “secular” media. In this context, the effects of 
Justice and Development Party’s effects on the Turkish media also reached the 
public service broadcaster (Turkish Radio and Television – TRT). 
 
Methodologies of this Study: Reading a Neo Authoritarian Media 
System in the Context of Turkey Media Experiences 
In the book “Four Theory of the Press”; Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) 
begin their comparative analysis of media systems with a simple, but important, 
                                                          
1
 But In practice, attacks on freedom of expression persisted, and incidents such as the legal cases in 
2005 against the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink and author Orhan Pamuk for expressing 
their political views on the Turkish state and its minorities, were the focus of international attention. 
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question: “Why is the press as it is?” This fundamental question underlying the 
article’s analysis of the Turkey’s media structure is the same: Why is the Turkey’s 
media structure as it is? In order to be able to answer this question, the writer of 
this article, will first try clarifying the following issues. (1).Which political, 
economic and especially legislative change have influenced the situation and 
operation of the media since 1990s? To put this question differently: How were the 
process of liberalization and globalization trends affected within the national media 
field and how the process of transition affected the relationship between media and 
government? (2).What are the key components that can serve as the basis for 
identifying changes in a particular historical period? 
In order to be able to answer these questions, this study focuses on four aspects: 
State control over the operation of media companies (the influences of the states as 
an important media owner), support for the media, the integration and intertwining 
of the media and political-economical power elites and guaranteeing the credibility 
of media institutions. This study is based on the Jay G. Blumler and Michael 
Gurevitch (1995, pp. 59-72) discussion on the relationship between media systems 
and democracy nexus. A similar methodological framework for comparative media 
systems has been put forwards by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004, p. 21) in 
the “Comparing Media Systems”. In Hallin and Mancini’s opinion, the analysis 
should embrace four aspects of the media systems: The development of media 
markets (primarily the high circulation of media markets), political parallelism (the 
level and nature of links between the media and political parties) and the 
development of professionalism in journalism especially the level of state 
intervention in media system. Based on the variation on these dimensions, Hallin 
and Manchini (2004, p. 22) developed three models for the comparison of the 
media systems in Western Europe and North America. These models are: (1) 
Polarized Pluralist or Mediterranean Model, for Southern European Countries like 
France, Greece and Italy. (2) Democratic Corporatist or North/Central European 
Model like Germany, Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. (3) Liberal or North 
Atlantic Model like United States, Great Britain and Canada. The four dimensions 
that developed by Halin and Mancini might be useful in delineating and analysing 
the main features of the media systems also in the context of “de-westernize” 
media system like Turkey. As Esra Özcan (2007, p. 3) has explained it; 
“Considering the geographical clustering that appears in their work the similarities 
that the Turkish media system shares with that model is not surprising. The 
intellectual ties that were established with French literary cultures at the end of the 
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19th
 
century, a similar Mediterranean culture and the long tradition of paternalistic 
and clientalistic politics had their impact on the development of media system in 
Turkey as in other Southern European countries”. (Özcan, 2007, p. 3)
  
The characteristic features of Turkey’s heavily concentrated and paternalistic 
traditions like the other media experience such as in the Southern European 
countries has emerged a paternalistic and clientalistic media structure. On the other 
hand, the interdependence between political and media elites and the strong 
clientelistic relations that characterize the Turkey’s political system are identified 
as the main factors. As Hedwing de Smaele (1999, p. 173), media systems are 
given shape not only by economic but also political and cultural factors. In this 
context, I will analyze the “problems” facing the media system of Turkey, 
especially the problems facing journalists and the institution of journalism of 
Turkey, by addressing four interrelated phenomena: (1) The concentration of media 
ownership and its threats to the media pluralism in Turkey. (2) Media owner’s 
efforts on the freedom of expression. In this context, the ill-defined relationships 
between media owners and the governments. (3) Government legislation that 
affects the rights and working conditions of news workers. (4) Political parallelism, 
the level and nature of links between media and political parties, and clientelistic 
relations which affect a freedom of expression. In this regard, Daniel Hallin and 
Stylianos Papathanasopoulos (2002, pp. 184-185) point out “parochial 
peculiarities” as a key reason for thereat to the pluralism of the media. For Hallin 
and Papathanasopoulos (2002, pp. 184-185); “the dichotomy between the liberal 
perspective, for which democratization of the media is purely a matter of the 
elimination of state interference, and the critical political economy perspective, 
which has focused on the control of media by private capital, but has until now not 
been very sophisticated in its analysis of variations in the relation capital to the 
state, political parties and other institutions. Political and economic institutions do 
not develop separately, and it is crucial that we develop analytical tools that cut 
across this dichotomy.” (Hallin and Papathanasopoulos, 2002, pp.184-185)  
As Hallin and Papathanasopoulos (2002, p. 185) emphasised, although the 
overlooking theoretical approach such as critical political economy can be used as 
useful tools for the analysis of national/regional media systems, there is a need for 
more context-bound research and theoretical implementation. Therefore this study 
is based upon a “more context-bound” research and theory. As Christian 
Christensen (2007, p. 180) argues; “this is particularly true in the case of work 
form or about Turkey, a country which as a subject of academic research, has 
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found itself caught in an intellectual and theoretical no-man’s land located 
somewhere between south-eastern Europe and the Middle East”. In this regard; as a 
candidate country of European Union, the Turkish media experience not only in 
relation to those of geographically, politically, economically dimensions but also 
historically proximate nations/regions aspects of the media systems. This approach, 
which will be the primary focus of this article, is to use the Turkish media 
experience to re-evaluate or reframe arguments concerning media in advanced 
industrial democracies. Therefore, in an effort to position the Turkey’s media 
experience, it is argued by communication scholars, helps to “internationalize” and 
“de-westernize” media theory. These are termed in the John Nerone’s (1995, p. 38) 
arguments. According to John Nerone (1995, p. 38); “the possibility of 
authoritarianism in communications is present wherever the authority of power 
exists and is exercised to limit or suppress or define people’s thoughts or 
expressions”. This view is debated by other communications scholar like Colin 
Spark, John Downing and Kaarle Nordenstreng who look to the Russian and East 
European experience to confirm the malevolent influence of commercial/private 
capital on the media. This view has argued; the power of state and the power of 
private capital, having on equivalent (of course) negative effects on the health of 
Habermas’s public sphere theory. This view sees the “systemic continuity” 
between new and old media systems (quoted in Becker, 2004, pp. 141-142). The 
question of “who owns the media” has always occupied a prominent place in 
discussion concerning journalistic freedom, media performance and their social 
roles. As Dennis McQuail (2000, p. 198) reminds, the argument about a causal link 
between media ownership and the nature of their operation is not necessarily 
grounded in Marxist philosophy but can be regarded as a “commonsense axiom” 
summarized in Herbert Altshull’s “second law of journalism” stating that “the 
contents of the media always reflect interests of who finance them.” (McQuail, 
2000, p. 198) Even if the will of the owners is only one factor determining the 
content and performance of the media, the issue of media ownership has always 
been considered of crucial importance for a democratic society. In the case of 
Turkey, national media spaces are very noticeable in terms of not only having the 
paradigmatic shifted of media policies but also an understanding of neo 
authoritarian media systems in the age of globalization. 
The aim of this article, on the one hand, is to examine both of the government and 
media relationship nexus more closely and analyze the Turkey’s media market in a 
broader context of the theoretical debates about the impact of ownership and 
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internationalization on media pluralism and performance. On the other hand, 
government pressures on the freedom of expression since 2002 and reflections on 
the media pluralism. I will analyze media pluralism and ownership structure of 
Turkey’s national media space and then I will offer suggestions as to how the 
present situation in Turkey could open the door for the further refinement of 
research on, and regarding theory nationally and regionally specific media.  
 
Turkey’s Media in Transition: Media Ownership, Market 
Concentration and Democracy 
Turkey’s media experience stems from the macro economical and political 
transformations that have been occurring since 1980s. Specially, 1980s has a major 
role as reported by Altuğ Akın (2010, p. 2); 
“The coup d’etat of 1980s the third one after the military interventions of 1960 and 
1971, opened up the decade with harsh political implications. All political parties 
and the Constitution were eradicated; the left and right movements of the 1970s 
were dissolved while many members were imprisoned by the Junta; almost all civil 
society organizations, including labor unions and professional associations were 
banned. The ideological framework of the previous decade 
(socialist/communist/left vs. Islamist/nationalist/right) was replaced with state 
supported neo liberalism, which was represented by the Motherland Party (Anap), 
the winner of the 1983 elections.” (Akın, 2010, p. 2) 
Turkey’s intention was the integration of neo liberal economic programme in the 
1980s. And, as a result of the third military coup in 1980, the door was opened to 
the neo liberal policy agenda. This change in the Turkey’s political, economical, 
cultural and sociological scenes has been free market domination in place of State’s 
regulatory power. This observable change in the Turkey’s media experiences 
follows the global trend. According to Richard D. Murphy (2007:5); “in terms of 
media and communication technologies, many of the structural network and 
relationships of capital began to surface in different countries around the world in 
the 1980s, as nation changed their telecommunications structures and policy to 
eliminate trade barriers, promote competition and create opportunities for 
economic development”. In this context as Hernan Galpherin (1999, p. 629) asserts 
that; “questions of media access, diversity, ownership and content regulation define 
the type and quality of public sphere at work within a nation or region, because the 
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media have become the key scarce in the struggle over publicness in contemporary 
political systems”. These observable changes in the contemporary political systems 
have always been a several aspect as Richard A. Gershon (2007, pp. 22-24) has 
explained that several aspects of this new political agenda; (1) the common 
motivation for such regulatory and economic reforms was the perceived 
inefficiency of central planning and government-protected monopolies. (2) Which 
were characterized by poor financial performance, overstaffing and dependency on 
government subsidies (3) poor export performance However, as Hernan Galpherin 
(1999, p. 630) asserts that; while exemptions and side agreements regarding the 
cultural industries abounded in regional trade agreements, marking the tensions 
between economic initiatives and cultural sovereignty, the restructuring of media 
and telecommunications markets nevertheless exploded in the 1990s. In fact to 
nurture and guide this process, on January 1 1995, the World Trade Organization 
was created and tasked with enforcing international trade agreements and setting a 
global agenda for privatization and liberalization while removing protectionism. As 
Richard Murphy (2007, p. 6) asserts that the creation of the World Trade 
Organization coincided with an unprecedented number of mergers and acquisitions 
among transnational media corporations which aggressively pursued the 
opportunities that privatization provided. At the same time Turkey followed a 
second global trend that was directly related with the telecommunication and media 
sectors. As Altuğ Akın (2010, p. 3) has noted, this action paved the way for the 
deployment of these technologies and infrastructures for economic interest. From 
being controlled by a public service monopoly, TRT, with only one channel to a 
staggering 270 television channels crowding the airwaves in the early 2000s, this 
signified, four times as many as in neighbouring Greece. After the approval of the 
commercial channels entrance in the media sector in 1994, major changes took 
place in the national media spaces regarding its structural characteristics, 
particularly the new ownership structures. Until 1990’s, the Turkey’s media 
ownership structure has been divided into two branch basically. Public service 
broadcaster, TRT (Turkish Radio and Television) has dominated in the radio and 
television that operates as a state monopoly while heavily Istanbul-based private 
owners have dominated by printing and publishing. As Doğan Tılıç (2000, p. 1) 
emphasised; “After the 1980’s, the ownership structure in the media of Turkey 
changed dramatically”. Traditional media ownership which is based on family 
enterprises or journalist-owner structure was replaced by one of the “new 
ownership” model. According to Tılıç, almost every journalist has complained 
about the “negative” influences of the new ownership structure. This new model 
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represents extreme commercialization and it’s seen to be directly influencing both 
the communication process and individual journalists. In fact, the true shift in 
media ownership in Turkey, came in the mid-1980’s has been followed the shift to 
free market policies was a core element of the broader changes that took place in 
Turkey like other liberal democratic countries, especially Greek media experience 
after 1980’s (Leandros, 2010, p. 886). As Christensen (2007, p. 182) has noted, 
from the studies on media in south-eastern Europe, Latin America and Turkey, a 
number of issues, or similarities, as key: (1) The rapid and sometimes uncontrolled 
spread of free market policies and ideologies, (2) The general perception in the 
population of a link between the free market and the democratization process, (3) 
The development of (and changes within) journalism and the mass media before, 
during and after the advent of free market policies, (4) The importance of the 
notion of “clientelism”. This is especially true for the Turkey’s media experience. 
After the 1980’s, transition from highly centralized economy, heavy military 
influence and the state-run media, to a more free market economy with privately 
owned newspaper and television stations, was seen by some as a moment for hope 
(Christensen, 2007, p. 182). Although, neo liberal media policies have perceived as 
the democracy and the freedom of expression by a number of scholars such as M. 
Lütfullah Karaman and Bülent Aras (2000, p. 46)1, Turkey’s media power has 
concentrated in the hands of few media “moguls”. At that time, media’s power was 
abused by owners. Even during the financial crises of late 2000 and early 2001 in 
Turkey the “knock-on” effect on the journalists were devastating. In the period of 
the financial crash, between 3000 and 5000 journalist and media workers lost their 
job (Christensen, 2007, 193). As Aslı Tunç (2004, p. 310) puts it, “the media owner 
has the last word in Turkey”. As Oxford Business Group (2004, p. 145) has noted, 
for Turkish media conglomerates, broadcasting was primarily a means of wielding 
the political and economic muscle. Despite Turkey’s national media space, profits 
in the media business were pessimistic compared to the vast investments attracted 
to the sector throughout the 1990s-2000s, numerous large industrial holdings, had 
not hesitated to join the fierce competition. According to various scholars (Adakli, 
2001, pp. 161-162; Catalbas, 2000, pp. 127-132; OBG, 2004, p. 145; Sönmez, 
1995, pp. 4-6), this “rush to media business” was an attempt motivated by intent at 
exploiting not only the media’s cultural influence, but also potential political 
benefits as well. Involvement in Turkish media allowed the companies to gain state 
                                                          
1
 For instance, M. Lütfullah Karaman and Bülent Aras (2000, p. 46) have noted, have noted that, 
during the 1990’s the development of private media systems in Turkey led to a number of changes to 
oppressive “legal norms established earlier on under the monopoly of state control”. 
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loans and provided them with a tool to pressure the government. In this 
atmosphere, the concentration of power (economic, political and symbolic) in the 
hands of a few media conglomerate was inevitable. Furthermore, as the media 
business consolidated towards the early 2000s, the revenues increased as well as 
the economic expectations facing the companies from their owners and 
shareholders. Thus, ratings and advertisement revenues turned out to be the sole 
determinants of the dominant profit-oriented media rationale1.  
Media ownership usually has direct implications for the character and the extent of 
media pluralism, which is largely believed to be an essential condition for the 
functioning of the democratic public sphere. Despite the important role that media 
play in shaping public opinion and the democratic process, the word of “pluralism” 
hasn’t been clearly explained neither in media policies nor in the implementation of 
regulation through neo liberal policy paradigm. That phenomenon was obviously 
observed in Turkey. As Gillian Doyle (2002, p. 11) puts it; “Pluralism is generally 
associated with diversity in the media; the presence of a number of different and 
independent voices, and of differing political opinions and representations of 
culture within the media”. Media pluralism is recognized as a special regulation 
issues by European Union and defined as “... is a concept that embraces aspects 
such as diversity in the ownership of media outlets, and variety in the sources of 
information and in the range of media content available to the public” (sees the 
more details in Commission of the European Union, 2007, p. 5). For instance, 
European Convention on Human Rights has got a special regulation on media 
pluralism. Especially, under the Article 10 of this policy document, democratic 
states are obliged to protect and to take positive measures for diversity of opinion 
in the media. Furthermore, protection and improvement of media pluralism have 
been the important dimensions of the European Union’s media policy agenda. In 
this regard, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the Commission 
of the European Union, as seen in many reports and resolutions, have underlined 
the crucial democratic role of the media and related need for pluralism, tolerance 
and openness (Leandros, 2010, p. 886). Nevertheless it is a well documented fact 
that European Union tried and finally failed to harmonize European media, not 
                                                          
1
 For instance, creative programming strategies of the early years of commercial broadcasting, 
diversity of the television content and especially the amount of information-related programs 
diminished dramatically. 
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only external but also internal1, pluralism regulation since-1990s (Haurtcourt, 
2007, p. 168). As Alison Hartcourt (2007, p. 12) has explained;  
“The European Union’s media market regulation is part of an umbrella regulatory 
framework for communications. Significantly, the EU’s framework for the 
communication sector is rooted in industrial policy. Principal concerns have been 
the drive for capital investment and correction of the trade imbalance with the 
United States.” 
According to Hartcourt (2007, p. 12), the European Union sees media policy as an 
apparatus of Europeanization process by conducting harmonization of national 
media policies2. In this context, observable changes in the media policy paradigm 
of Turkey, on the one hand, are based on the candidacy of European Union. As 
Miyase Christensen (2010, p. 178) has explained; “since the country became a 
candidate to the EU in 1999, Turkish democratic rights in general, and freedom of 
expression in particular, have occupied a great deal of political media space both in 
Turkey and abroad”. Especially, media pluralism in Turkey has been a great deal of 
interest at the international level. To say that, discussion concerning the limits of 
media pluralism, tolerance of ethnic-cultural diversity and freedom of expression 
as complementary aspects of the media systems in Turkey often centre on 
questions related with state censorship and legislative constraints (Christensen, 
2010, p. 178). Although the relationship between Turkey and European Union 
affects Turkey’s media policy paradigm shift and in this regard, ongoing 
privatization as harmonization practices of Turkey’s national media policies with 
European Union, other several factors are very important hauls for the limits of the 
pluralism of Turkey’s media. Especially media owners and the government’s 
relationship nexus has been affected in the Turkey’s national media spaces. 
Although, the European Union’s. (2008, p. 14) “2008 Country Progress Report”; 
suggest that “open debates continues in the national Turkish media on a wide range 
                                                          
1
 Media pluralism has distinguished two main forms. There are “external pluralism” and “internal 
pluralism”. External pluralism is defined by pluralism of media ownership and internal pluralism is 
defined by the pluralism of media contents. Internal and external pluralism is the complementary 
dimension of freedom of expressions. 
2
 As Alison Hartcourt (2007, p. 160) have puts it, from the mid-1980s, a gradual pattern of market 
liberalisation, regulation and deregulation began to emerge in the countries under observation (his 
research is based on Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Spain media experiences). Three key 
regulatory overhauls of national media policies can be distinctly marked as occurring just after the 
EU’s 1986 Single European Act (SEA), the 1989 Television Without Frontiers Directive and during 
the mid-1990s. The SEA may not have been a direct catalyst of media market liberalisation; however 
its liberal market philosophy was extremely significant. Following the 1986 SEA, many European 
Countries liberalised their media market. 
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of issues, including those perceived as sensitive by Turkey’s society in terms of 
Habermasian “public sphere theory”, Turkey’s national public sphere goes to “re-
feudalisation”1 by media owners. Although the media experience of Turkey, never 
a unique example and also in recent years the technological, economical and social 
facets of globalization and have affected media ownership structures all over the 
neo liberal democracies but a question, “how to regulate the media market?” 
become increasingly important dimensions in the state of the Turkey media 
policies. Especially after the financial crashes, November 2000 and February 2001, 
of the Turkey’s economy and in this respect Justice and Development Party’s 
coming to the power, that question has become more important since 2002.  
 
Rethinking Neo Authoritarian Media System: Turkey’s Media 
Experiences as a Case Study 
As Christian Christensen (2007, p. 182) notes, from the studies on media in South 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Turkey, a number of common issues emerge. 
Most relevant one of these commonalities is the rapid, as an observable in a 
number of cases sometimes uncontrolled, spread of free market policies and 
ideologies, and a general perception of a link between the free market and the 
democratization process. As a result of this “uncontrolled spread of free market 
policies and ideologies”, in the media landscape of Turkey, media giants have 
emerged. 
                                                          
1
 Habermasian concept of “public sphere” is commonly employed to signify the open realm of 
rational public discourse and debate, a realm which is conceptually linked with the very democratic 
process and in which individuals can freely discuss everyday issues of common concern. In his 
innovative work, Habermas (1989) intriguingly traces the historical development of public sphere 
from the Ancient Greece to the present. For Habermas the gradual spread of capitalism allowed an 
emerged of a distinctive forms of public sphere; “the bourgeois public sphere” (Tsekeris, 2008, p. 12). 
However, that form of public spheres has been “structural transformations” over the ages. In this 
context as Habermas (1989, p. 121) have note it, the term of “re-feudalisation” aiming to 
comprehensively demonstrate the overwhelming interweaving of the public and private realm, as well 
as the complex way in which public affairs have been sequentially and structurally transformed into 
occasions for displays of the powers that be, rather than into real sites of productive and useful 
contestation between opposing arguments, policies and viewpoint. As Charambolos Tsekeris (2008, 
p. 16) have explained; “Contemporary media cultures are characterised by the progressive 
privatisation (or even 'atomisation') of the citizenry and the trivialization and glamorisation of 
questions of public concern and interest. The hijacking of communicative questions by monopolistic 
concerns seemingly converts citizens into consumers (of information and images) and politicians into 
media stars protected from rational questioning”. 
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Some aspect of the rapid growth of handful Turkish media giants is similar to the 
“second tier media firms” of newly industrialized South American countries that 
gained visible national and regional dominance since 1990s1. But this liberalization 
programme was undertaken to create opportunities for big business and relieve 
government of some of its burdens, not deepen democratic participation (Murphy, 
2007, p. 8). This trend especially was seen in the national media landscape of 
Turkey. Although the number of newspapers, magazines, radio channels and 
television stations has increased steadily in Turkey, this hasn’t provided a media 
pluralism. 
 
Print Media and Ownership Concentration 
According to most recent report of European Journalism Centre (2010, p. 1); 
“mainstream media in Turkey is plagued with severe problems”. In the national 
media spaces of Turkey; 70 percent of the media (including national newspapers, 
radio stations and television channels and national internet services) are owned by 
few cross-media groups. Nationalistic rhetoric and self-censorship is paramount 
and media are vulnerable against political powers (the military, religious 
communities, bureaucratic elites, governments etc). Intervention of the government 
is usefully political practices; political parallelism and clientelism is very 
prevailing in the daily routines of the Turkey’s media experience, the relationship 
is between media and government is far away a democratic media system. As 
Andrew Finkel (2000:152) has noted it; “the media in Turkey embody a number of 
paradoxes. It is both the victim of rights abuse, the clarion of reform, yet, an 
industry that understands well the methods of a lax business environment”. As 
Edwin C. Baker (2007, pp. 120-121) has explained; “Concentrated communicative 
power creates demagogic dangers for a democracy, reduces the number of owners 
who can choose to engage in watchdog roles, may reduce the variety in 
perspectives among the smaller group of people who had ultimate power to choose 
specific watchdog projects and multiplies the probable conflicts of interest that can 
muzzle these watchdogs” (Baker, 2007, pp. 120-121). 
                                                          
1
 As Richard Murphy (2007, p. 6) have explained, these transnational developments have largely 
supported the national and regional dominance of some of the most powerful “second tier media 
firms” of newly industrialized nations such as Brazil’s Globo, Mexico’s Televisa, Argentina’s Clarin 
and Venezuela’s Cisnero’s Group that have extensive ties and joint ventures with the largest media 
TNC’s as well as Wall Street’s investment banks. The cultural and political power that these media 
groups well and the economic integration they enjoy are firmly rooted in laisez-faire agreements and 
clientelism established early on with the state in most Latin American countries.   
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In this chapter, I’ll focus on phenomenon of the “media moguls” and the related 
problems of the media “insturmentalization” which is usually associated with the 
concentration of communication power into the hands of a few cross-media groups, 
to say that a few hegemonic powers in the national media and public sphere, in 
Turkey. That hegemonic powers, in the national media landscape of Turkey, 
activities have been expanded to the other sectors beyond media such as tourism, 
finance, automotive industries, construction and infrastructure equipment since 
1980’s. The national media landscape has been heavily dominated by large multi-
sectoral groups such as Doğan Media Group, Turkuaz, Ciner Group, Çukurova 
Group, Doğuş Group and Feza Group. All of the major commercial channels, radio 
stations, internet service providers and national newspapers belong to these media 
holdings. Moreover the distribution of print media is in the hands of Doğan 
Group’s company “Yay-Sat” and Turkuaz Group’s company “Turkuaz Dağıtım 
Pazarlama”. Therefore, “free marketplace of ideas” is subject to these large 
conglomerates in Turkey. Indeed, these large conglomerates are also active in 
many other sectors. Especially those sectors depend on or heavily affected by the 
government’s decision or regulation. Therefore, owners of the media have seen the 
media vulnerable for their interest, for instance against the political power, 
government, bureaucratic elites, military, etc. In this respect, the media have been 
used as a “defensive weapon” by media owners against rival politics or business 
concern. Table 1 is shows national media markets in the period of 2010-2011, and 
then I’ll make an analysis of ownership and control structure in the mainstream 
media groups.  
Table 1. Ownership Structure and Newspaper’s Average Daily Circulation in the 
National Media Landscape of Turkey 
Newspapers Average Daily Circulation 
2010-2011 
Owner 
Hürriyet 
 
Referans 
 
Milliyet 
 
Radikal 
 
Posta 
 
Vatan 
 
447.327 
 
65.719 
 
162.306 
 
67.715 
 
494.299 
 
130.291 
 
Doğan Media Group 
Doğan Publishing Holding 
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Fanatik 
 
Hürriyet Daily News 
 
Iz Ruk v Ruki  
(Published and distributed in 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
since 1992)  
 
Expressz  
(Published and distributed in 
Hungary since 1994)  
 
Oglasnik  
(Published and distributed in 
Croatia since 2000) Oglasnik is a 
serial advertisement newspaper 
and took a 60 percent in the 
Croatia’s media market. 
 
191.602 
 
4.843 
 
20.000 
 
 
 
 
 
100.000 
Sabah 
 
Takvim 
 
 
Fotomaç 
 
Yeni Asır 
 
 
338.490 
 
115.917 
 
 
206.581 
 
30.558 
 
Turkuaz Media Group 
Habertürk 256.551 Ciner Media Group 
 
Zaman 
 
Today’s Zaman 
 
865.419 
 
5.778 
 
Feza Media Gorup 
Akşam 
 
Güneş 
 
Alem  
 
Tercüman 
 
143.359 
 
101.411 
 
65.664 
 
54.099 
Çukurova Media Group 
Total Daily Newspaper Circulation 3.965.123  
(http://www.ejc.net/media_landscapearticle/Turkey.html,http://www.turkmedya.com.tr,http://www.cu
kurova.com.tr,http://www.dmg.com.tr,http:www.turkuazyayın.com.tr). 
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Although Turkey’s population is increasing steadily, newspaper circulation is 
lowest degree and moreover, concentrated ownership is very high degree. After the 
drastic developments that came about in the 1990s set the scene for the birth of the 
Turkish media industry which was characterised intensified financial maneuvers 
with the lack of proper regulation (Akin, 2010:4). As a result of these conditions, 
the national media spaces of Turkey have been characterised by concentrated 
ownership, the establishment of cross-media monopolies, unregulated integration 
(in both vertically and horizontally) along with diversification in different sectors. 
Turkey’s media landscapes was dominated by only five cross media groups; three 
share more than 76% of all national media revenues in different branches 
(publishing, broadcasting, magazines and so forth). On the other hand, Turkey’s 
media monopolies and the government’s relationship is complex and symbiotic 
because government in Turkey expected obedience while the media owners 
expected a commercial gain. In this context, as it aspires for full European Union 
membership, Turkey is still struggling with freedom of expression, raising 
questions whether it can ever join the European Union or will simply remain a 
suspended bridge between East and West. Indeed, Turkey’s recent history revealed 
that these two examples of Dogan Media Group and Turkuaz Media Group are 
very remarkable cases for the government and the media group’s relation. For 
instance, Doğan Publishing Holding is the largest and the most prominent media 
giant in Turkey. Doğan Publishing has got approximately 60 percent of all the 
Turkey’s media. But in 2009, Turkey's media king pin returns to the ranks despite 
scandal. Although Doğan Yayin Holding (Doğan Publishing Holding), the 
country's largest media group, was fined 3.8 billion liras (approximately 2.5 billion 
dollars) in September 2009 for tax evasion, on top of another 862,4 million liras 
(approximately 583 million dollars) fine in February 2009. Company is challenging 
those penalties in court; a tax court overturned $520 million in February 2010. 
Officially retired in January, handing post to daughter Arzuhan Doğan; Dogan will 
remain as honorary president. His four daughters own shares worth about 450 
million dollars apiece in the holding company; not reflected in his net worth. 
Doğan Publishing Holding’s newspaper (Hürriyet, Radikal and Milliyet) accused 
the government of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan of using the tax charge as a way 
to silence a press critical of the government. Erdogan has criticised Aydın Doğan 
and his media companies for unfair reporting and called on his AK Party members 
to boycott his newspapers (http://www.reuters.com). After this tax penalty, adverse 
columnists like “Emin Çölaşan” and “Bekir Coskun” have been dismissed by the 
Group. For rethinking of neo authoritarian media systems in the age of neo 
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liberalism, another remarkable case was Turkuaz Media Group and the government 
relations. Turkuaz Media Group was newly established in the Turkey’s media. 
After the financial crashes in 2000-2011, Group has bought Sabah (Turkey’s 
second larger circulated newspaper) and television channel –ATV- from the 
Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (SDIF-Savings Deposit Insurance Fund) Çalık 
Holding owns Turkuaz Media Group. Çalık Group has connections with ruling 
party (Justice and Development Party). For instance, the Chief Executive Officer of 
the Group (Berat Albayrak) is the “son-in-law” of the Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdoğan. Çalık Group bought Sabah and A TV. The Group took a loan for the 
process from publicly owned banks, Halkbank and Vakıfbank. Another cross-
media company, Feza Media Group, is the case of Islamic media which rase after 
2002 in Turkey. Feza Group is the Islamist-Liberal community which has close and 
complex relationship with the Islamic sect leader Fettullah Gülen. Gülen’s 
community has affected the government. At the same time Gülen movement is 
increasingly visible through the work of a range of institutions across the world. 
In Turkey, the rise of the Islamic movements during 1980s was also the result of 
the dissent generated by top down modernization, radical state secularism and the 
official ideology which rendered groups invisible that do not fit into officially 
tailored definitions of a modernized society. (Özcan, 2007, p. 4) Following the 
liberalization and commercialization of the 1990s, Islamic Groups and the 
discourse has risen in the public sphere. But this trend has led to the way of 
political and ideological polarization in the national media space of Turkey. As 
Ayşe Öncü (2000, p. 302) has explained, this can also be attributed to the 
increasing interaction among the journalists and opinion makers belonging to 
different ideological camps in the roundtables and other televised forms. However, 
some of the Islamic newspapers and television channels which were more 
conservative at their inception have become more liberalized towards the end of the 
1990s, due to the need for competition for advertising revenues and for a broader 
audience appeal. Nevertheless Feza Group is not a unique example of the Turkey’s 
Islamic media. Yeni Şafak (average daily circulation is 100.000 in 2011) is owned 
by Albayrak business group and also this media group has connections with ruling 
party (Justice and Development). The Islamic Vakit (average daily circulation is 
50.000 in 2011) is more radical and sensationalist in content and has been 
prosecuted several times (http://www.ejc.net). Another Islamic newspaper is Milli 
Gazete (average daily circulation is 50.000 in 2011) is the voice of Milli Görüş 
which has been the fundamentalist Islamic political tradition in Turkey that aims at 
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substantial restructuring of the state in compliance with the maxims of Islam. Other 
media groups in Turkey such as Cumhuriyet (average daily circulation is 50.000 in 
2011) which is not entirely owned by any multi-sectoral group. Therefore, it is only 
one example of independent newspaper in the Turkey’s national media sphere.  
The dominance of cross media giants in the media world in Turkey is not only 
limited to control over the national newspaper market but also other branch of 
media sector such as television and advertising.  
 
Ownership Concentration in the Television Sector  
With over 25 million television-owning households, the Turkey’s broadcasting 
market is one of the largest in Europe. In 2011, there were more than 400 television 
stations in the country, 23 of which were national and 16 were regional ones. All of 
the national television channels are also in cable and satellite too. Despite the large 
number of outlets, the multi sectoral groups again are the main actors in the private 
broadcasting market. A significant feature of the Turkey’s broadcasting field since 
its liberalization in 1990s is the marginalization of the public broadcaster (TRT-
Turkish Radio and Television). Although the early years of de-regulated Turkish 
media were celebrated by the majority of the population and the prevailing 
democratic expectations from the commercial channels in Turkey were mostly 
rooted in the democratic discrepancy of the public service broadcaster, commercial 
channels haven’t been a source of democratic media system and media pluralism. 
Therefore as Christian Christensen (2007, p. 183) has pointed out, the media 
honeymoon in Turkey was short lived. This is partly based, on the one hand on 
speed with which the Turkish business world recognized the myriad possibilities 
(economically and politically) offered through the control of media channels was 
not matched by swift, effective action on the part of Turkish government to 
regulate and increasingly hyper-commercialized, oligopolistic system. On the other 
hand, lack of detailed regulation on the cross media ownership and sector specific 
regulation led to the concentrated ownership in Turkey.  
Table 2 shows ownership and control structure of the television sector in the 
national media spaces in Turkey. Although, average audience share and rating 
levels have important aspects of understanding the hegemony of cross-media giants 
in Turkey but audience measurement methods are very questionable. For example 
survey which was conducted on the families in Turkey was based on old variables 
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which changed modernization process in Turkey. Therefore, the article has 
preferred an analysis on television ownership and control structure in Turkey.  
Table 2. Ownership and Control Structure in the Television Sector 
Television Channel’s Owner 
Kanal D 
Star 
CNN-Türk 
TNT 
Dogan Publishing Holding 
A TV Turkuaz Media Group 
Show TV 
Sky Türk 
Çukurova Holding 
Haber Türk Ciner Media Group 
NTV 
NTV SPORT 
Doğus Holding 
Samanyolu TV Feza Group 
Kanal 7 Islamist Sect Milli Görüş 
Channel 24 Sancak Media Group 
TRT (public broadcaster) State 
Fox TV News Netherlands Company1 
(http://www.ejc.net) 
Public service broadcaster, TRT, has followed a diversification strategy since 2006. 
After the period of governmental change, Turkey’s public service broadcaster 
entered a restructuring period in both structure, especially growing and 
dissemination, and content change. According to Raşit Kaya (1999, p. 7), the 
ideological background of TRT, as it came into being in 1964, was development by 
“modernization” and “development” paradigms that dominated the country and 
benefited from United States financial aids. TRT’s mission is to create ideological 
support from public for state policies. This assumption that the public service 
broadcaster as conveyors of the state’s ideology has always been valid. However, 
as Akın Altuğ (2010, p. 6) has noted, the vastly elitist, evidently from “top to 
bottom” and by large homogenizing broadcasting policies of TRT, did not meet the 
cultural, political and social demands of the majority of Turkish public. Therefore, 
TRT’s improving strategies with 11 national and 2 international channels2 is only 
                                                          
1
 Formerly Ihlas Group’s TGRT Channel’s 51 percent share has been sold to News Netherlands 
Group Company owned by Rupert Murdock in September 2006. (http://www.ejc.net). 
2
 TRT’s divertisification strategy is based on audience segmentation. Therefore this transition has 
called from broadcast to narrowcast or thematic broadcasting strategies. TRT has 11 national 
television channels: TRT-1 (general), TRT-2 (art and culture), TRT-3 (live broadcast from the 
Turkish National Grand Assembly and youth and youth, sports, music programs), TRT-4 (education), 
and TRT-Müzik (music channel).  TRT has also one regional television channel TRT -GAP 
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remain the rise of the channels but this did not nurture pluralism in the media and 
especially these trends didn’t bring democratic communication possibilities. 
Therefore the diversification process of TRT is a new concentration in the Turkish 
media by state. As a result of concentrated ownership Turkey’s media have got 
some internal problems. The outcome of this situation, during the last 25 years, has 
been a very biased and extremely nationalistic media landscape, and all attempts of 
independent journalism practice (despite some positive developments) remain 
dangerous.  
The news coverage of mainstream media quite often depends on the degree to 
which the published news would serve the business interests of the conglomerates 
which own the media outlets, and that, of course, is closely linked to the impact of 
news on the position of the established interest groups. In this environment media 
outlets adopt strategic editorial policies and become pro-government, pro-military 
or sect-oriented (http://www.ejc.net). This is the other but related aspect of the 
media pluralism that I’ll address in the next section. 
 
Become a Journalist in the Highly Concentrated Media World 
The characteristic feature of Turkey’s heavily monopolized media and its 
connection with the working conditions in the media world has paved the way to a 
number of internal problems. As Robert McChesney (2000, p. 26) has explained; 
“the corruption of journalistic integrity is always bad, but it becomes obscene 
under conditions of extreme media concentration”. In the faces of Turkey’s media 
experience, this old-term problem in the Turkey’s media structure has been 
intensified since 1980s. After the period of the new media owners entered the 
Turkey’s national media world, journalistic practices and working conditions of the 
journalists changed fundamentally. This radical shift in terms of organizational 
power resulted in the owner’s total control over editorial policies, resource 
allocation, employee salaries, promotion and dismissal of staff and especially 
appointment of the editor-in-chief and other editor (Tunç, 2004, p. 5). For instance, 
as Aslı Tunç (2004, p. 5) has explained; those chosen editors –in chief swiftly 
                                                                                                                                                   
(especially targeted southeastern region of Turkey Anatolia) and two international channels TRT-
Türk (especially targeted to Europe, United States of America and Australia) and TRT-Avaz 
(especially targeted Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia). According to European Journalism 
Centre’s report (2010, p. 4) in January 2009 as a part of new democratization process initiated by the 
government, Turkey’s first full time Kurdish Channel, TRT-6, was launched. This channel has 
targeted Kurdish citizens who lives in Turkey. 
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began to serve their bosses as managers, losing their independent journalistic 
judgements, enjoying their upper middle-class lifestyles with astronomical salaries 
and concurrently guarding financial interests of their bosses and acting as 
spokespersons on their behalf. These trends have reflections on the journalistic 
routines by editorial hegemony. Editorial hegemony prevails in all major media 
outlets; news is overruled or bent in accordance with the desire of editor-in-chief 
who takes hints from the media owners. On the other hand, the rights of journalists 
and correspondent’s “vis-à-vis” editorial staff are not protected. In terms of 
salaries, working conditions and lifestyles young media workers who are 
committed to truthful reporting suffer from very precarious work conditions. Some 
aspects of these working conditions are related to the journalist unions which were 
under attack by new media owners. As Christensen (2007, p. 190) have assets, 
from the very early years of the commercial media boom in Turkey trade unions 
were under attack by corporate owners. According to reports of International 
Federation on journalist and European Federation on journalist (2002, p. 4) has 
pointed out; “At the beginning of the 1990s, workers of two major newspapers, 
Hürriyet and Milliyet, resigned from the union because of pressure from the 
employer”. This situation is assessable as a “contradictory continuities” in the 
Turkey’s media world. As Christensen (2007, p. 192) has explained; “If blunt 
tactics such as threatening journalist with job termination should they fail to leave 
the union did not work, most newspapers and television owners in Turkey made 
sure that their employees stayed in line via a raft of other anti union strategies”.  
In fact the most common of these was the complicated tactic of breaking the larger 
media company into myriad subcontracting mini companies. Therefore the 
journalists found themselves by subcontracted companies with only a handful of 
staff (Christensen, 2007, p. 192). On the other hand, to forming complicated 
employment structures media conglomerates in Turkey reduce the power of 
journalist by taking advantage of a number of other legal loopholes. Cross-media 
giants in Turkey forced all their employees to sign a clause (No: 1475 Labour Act) 
of the law governing relations between employers and employees, instead of 
Clause 212 (Act on Labour Management in the Press) of the same law that grants 
special benefits to journalist such as early retirement and high minimum wages (see 
Özkırımlı, 2004, p. 171) while Clause 1475 basically reduced the journalist to the 
level of ordinary workers and invalidated privileges of being a journalist (Tunç, 
2004, p. 5). In this context, the journalist was made a fragile against owners. As a 
result of this fragility, journalist was to float into poverty line. Especially during 
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the period of financial crises in Turkey, there was fragile massive unemployment. 
As Ziya Öniş (2003, p. 15) has explained;  
“The striking magnitude of the crises may be illustrated by the fact that GNP in 
real terms declined by 9.4 per cent during the course of the year. The result was a 
dramatic drop in per capita income from $2,986 to $2,110 per annum and a 
massive increase in unemployment by 1 million people. The crises moreover, had a 
deep affect on all segments of society. Highly educated and skilled employees also 
lost their jobs in large numbers. Small and medium-sized business was severally 
affected, resulting in widespread bankruptcies and layoffs. The crisis also led a 
major increase in the number of people living below the $400 per month poverty 
line and the $200 per month subsistence line” (Öniş, 2003, p. 15). 
Ziya Öniş (2003, p. 15) has emphasised on the massive unemployment of highly 
educated and skilled workers during the financial crises, this assessment is 
especially true for the journalists in Turkey. For Christensen, the knock-on effect of 
the crises for journalists in Turkey was devastating. (Christensen, 2007, p. 193) 
Massive unemployment process, with 5000 journalists, has destructive affect in the 
media world. However, as Aslı Tunç (2003, p. 9) have emphasised, the financial 
crisis to rid themselves of unwanted or troublesome staff under the guise of 
economic necessity is used by the media owners. Indeed, during the economic 
crises in Turkey, the increasing control of the power of media owners has 
experienced significant developments. As Christensen (2007, p. 193) has 
emphasised, “savage cut-backs in staffing levels mean that jobs are even harder to 
find than before and with much lower salaries”. Therefore, before economic crisis 
the journalists had already had a limited job throughout the crisis, it has become 
much more difficult. As Christensen (2007, p. 193) have emphasised;  
“This coupled with the lack of any union or labour support means that journalists 
are in a weak position in terms of their professional independence. As if this level 
of corporate pressure were not enough, however, news workers in Turkey must 
deal with attacks on their independence and freedoms from another powerful actor: 
The state”. (Christensen, 2007, p. 193).  
There are important clues to reconsider the neo authoritarian media systems in the 
communication policy and the legal framework in Turkey. In the next section, I 
discuss communication policy and legal framework for the rethinking a neo 
authoritarian media system in Turkey. 
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Rethinking a Neo Authoritarian Media Systems in the Spiral Between 
State and the Ownership: Legislative Framework and Freedom of 
Expression in Turkey 
In the tradition of authoritarian government, the legal regulations are also often 
produced by the aforementioned forms of re-authoritarianism. Although depending 
upon to the candidacy of the European Union, the democratization process has 
gained an important dimension in the Turkey’s legislative frame; Turkey is the 
very remarkable case for this re-authoritarianism in the national media space. 
According to Miyase Christensen (2010, p. 182), parallel to Turkey’s candidacy 
bid to the European Union from December 1999 onwards, a gradual change could 
be seen as reform packages affecting both the legal frameworks and structural 
elements in political and economic domains were adopted1. However, Turkey’s 
media policies and some aspects of the freedom of expressions regulation have 
been considered as a reflection of state-centric modernity. As Fuat Keyman and 
Ahmet İçduygu (2005, p. 12) have explained, the process of the making of Turkey 
constitutes a “state centric modernity” with four defining elements: (1) a strong 
state tradition, (2) national developmentalism (3) an organic vision of society (for 
instance societal affairs were organized monolithically to serve the national 
interest, not individual rights and freedoms) and finally (4) republican model of 
citizenship (for instance the primacy of national interests over right and freedoms) 
all of which came to be destabilised, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. As a 
result of this, state-centric modernization has produced banal nationalism and state-
controlled media discourse. As Miyase Christensen (2010, p. 181) has emphasised;  
“State-controlled media discourse and everyday mediations of banal statism and 
nationalism have played significant roles in this process. Rather than constituting 
two disparate domains in Turkish social reality, popular culture and politics 
remained very much interlinked: Clandestine political deliberation found diverse 
avenues of articulation in the various forms and spheres of popular culture” 
(Christensen, 2010, p. 181).  
As Christensen (2010, p. 181) has emphasized, state centric modernization formed 
a state-controlled media discourse and banal nationalism in the daily practices of 
the national media. For Christian Christensen (2007, p. 195), the role of the 
Turkish state in the suppression of the free speech has been well documented. 
                                                          
1
 In this context, a number of amendments were made to the Turkish penal code in relation to human 
rights issues, such as the ratification of Protocol 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Indeed, it is the combination of state and corporate influence that must be 
considered in order to fully comprehend the problems facing Turkish Journalism. 
For Andrew Finkel (2005, p. 24), who is a journalist in Turkey for most of the 
1990s and who was charged under the Turkish Penal Code, a journalist in Turkey 
faces several threats not only from media owners and state but also from internal 
organization of the media companies. In this context, Finkel (2005, p. 24) has 
assessed this as follows; “Indeed, a strategy only to criticize the state and not 
consider the corporate cultures of media organizations themselves had led to an 
erosion of press freedom and legitimated bad practice”. However, until 1990s the 
state was the central agent that the limiting of freedom of expression and the 
restrictions were primarily based on the Article 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal 
Code (outlawing communist and socialist propaganda), Article 163 (against 
Islamist propaganda) and other more general articles restricting the expression of 
certain ideas and discourses (Christensen, 2010, p. 182). But these ongoing 
restrictions gained a new dimension with the new amendment which came into 
effect on 1 April 2005, Article 301. However, following an outcry from a number 
of groups, especially including many journalists, the Turkish parliament had a 
review and possibly amended on the code. However, this Article was changed in 
April 2008 and the Turkish parliament adopted a number of amendments geared 
toward enhancing freedom of expression in relation to Article 301. For Miyase 
Christensen (2010, p. 183) this changed as a result of “a development which has 
been a priority within the Accession Partnership Agreement with the European 
Union”. Article 301, especially section (1) and (2), was seen as a remarkable case 
for the rethinking of neo authoritarianism. In its current form, Article 301 
(Insulting being a Turk, the Republic, the organs and institutions of the State) reads 
as below (quated in Christensen, 2010, p. 183): (1) A person who publicly degrades 
the Turkish nation, the State of the Republic of Turkey, The Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the judicial 
bodies of the State, shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of 
six months to two years. (2) A person who publicly degrades the military or 
security organisations of the State shall be sentenced to a penalty in accordance 
with the first section. (3) The expressions of an opinion for the purpose of criticism 
do not constitute an offence. (4) The conduct of investigation for such offence shall 
be subject to the permission of the Minister of Justice.  
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Article 301 was taken together with other substances (for instance Article 125, 
Article 278, Article 329, Article 336 etc)1, journalist in Turkey are facing stiff legal 
regulations. So much so that as Christian Christensen (2007, p. 195) has reported; 
“under this legal guidelines, it would be virtually impossible for investigative 
journalists to, for example, expose political or military corruption, or to implicate a 
public official in criminal activity, without running the risk of themselves being 
convicted of a crime.” 
These ongoing restrictions in Turkey have gained a new aspect with the new 
broadcasting law which has come into effect in 2011. Although Turkish 
broadcasting legislation came into effect in 1994 and after the passing of the 
broadcasting regulations, concentration of the media sector intensified and 
commercial media content increasingly became more banal (Aksoy and Robins, 
1997, p. 1941), with the new law Prime Minister was given the authority to stop 
television broadcast for national security or the establishment of the public order. 
But with this regulation Prime Minister has gained a control on the national media 
space in Turkey. 
On the other hand, media pluralism or democratic communication a possibilities 
have never been a special arrangement in Turkey’s broadcasting legislation. 
Especially in the Turkish broadcasting legislation ownership rules are only for 
radio and television. The lack of cross-media regulation has profoundly shaped the 
Turkish media sector. In this context Turkey’s media regulation is like Spanish 
case (Llorens, 2010, p. 850). But, ownership regulation is based especially on the 
capital limits (shareholder limitations). Consequently, the private broadcasting Act 
in 2011 established that no individual or institution could hold more than %50 of 
the shares of one television or radio stations, this condition covers the foreign 
investors. The idea behind this regulation was that protecting each company’s 
ownership pluralism was a necessary step to avoid any threat to external pluralism. 
It was also a way to protect internal pluralism; no single company could have 
completed control over a private television broadcasting licence, because minimum 
of two shareholders are required. However, in the national media spaces of Turkey 
this regulation was not enough for protected media pluralism forms, external or 
internal, because Turkey’s media structure is characterised by heavily concentrated 
                                                          
1
 Articles 215, 216 and 217 of the Turkish Penal Code, which crimanilize offences against public 
order, also contribute to a restrictive environment leading to prosecuations based on the expression of 
certain political views and opinions (Chirstensen, 2010, p. 183). 
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ownership. And moreover media owners in Turkey have used alternative ways for 
the by-pass of this regulation practices.  
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, recent Turkish history has been shaped by the equally pervasive forces 
of “continuity” and “change”. For Miyase Christensen (2010, p.194); change was 
brought about by the dictates of an increasingly capitalistic global economic order 
and Turkey’s search for a place in it; in this context the constituent elements of this 
change in the axis of the emerging European Union membership, cultural 
globalization and a greater demand for democracy and social change. On the other 
hand; continuity which is the force that shaped the near past of Turkey, is also 
materialized in the form of the persistence of nationalism in some factions, a 
nepotistic relationship between state and capital, and a heavy handed military and 
patriarchal articulations of national and cultural allegiances in the public domain. 
In this context, as a result of structural reforms in the 1990s and 2000s not only 
economic sector but also social and cultural domain that aiming a harmonization 
process to European Union, contributed to the reshaping of the country’s 
socioeconomic and cultural landscapes that yielding new agendas, new relations of 
interest and new/revived sensitivities in the public domain (Christensen, 2010, p. 
194). In this regard, Turkey’s media experiences have been heavily affected by the 
transformation process of the States. Parallel to the States transformation process, 
national media landscape of Turkey since the late 1980s has been heavily affected 
and changed. The Turkey media system has been transformed by the entry of big 
industrial and merchant capital into media scene and by the “savage deregulation” 
of broadcasting. As a result of this changed, cross media ownership and media 
concentration emerged. In most cases, as seen in the national media spaces of 
Turkey, important media companies followed diversification strategies and in this 
respect, extending their activities in different sectors of the industry. There were 
also a number of general conglomerates that incorporated media outlets in their 
wider economic empires. Today, despite a large number of media outlets, a few 
leading players dominate the scene and account for about over 70 % of the 
television and national newspaper market. Therefore, the oligopolistic dominance 
of the media market limits structural pluralism and constitutes a threat to the 
diversity of information that is desirable in a democratic society. Furthermore, 
given the opinion-forming power of the media, increased influence of cross-media 
giants, has generated fears and allegations of preferential relationship with some 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                        Vol 5, No. 1/2011 
 
 66 
members of the political elite. In this regard, as Miyase Christensen (2010, p. 195) 
have emphasised; “the general problems faced by journalist in Turkey, today are 
the result of combination of factors, namely hyper commercialization, clientelism, 
a patrimonial relationship between the media and state, lack of unitization of 
journalists and lack of job security”. However, as observed in the Turkey’s national 
media spaces, regulatory responses to the problems of media concentration and 
cross ownership were contradictory and ineffective. On the one hand, the law that 
abolished state monopoly in television gave priority to existing media companies in 
granting a license and, more importantly, the Supreme Court of Radio and 
Television (RTUK) failed to establish enforceable licensing and contact rules. 
Even when legislation existed, media owners tend to ignore it. But the Turkey’s 
media experiment is not a unique example. As Christian Christensen (2007, p. 196) 
has said that, “as we have seen, the similarities between Greece and Turkey, for 
example, are striking: authoritarian histories, military interventions, restrictive 
media legislation, rapid market liberalization, clientelism and populist journalism”. 
In his article on the Greece media experiment, Nikos Leandros (2010, p. 886) has 
pointed out, “the interdependence between political and media elites and the strong 
clientelistic relations that characterised the Greek political system are identified as 
the main factors behind the ineffective and contradictory nature of media 
regulatory policies”. In this context, the national media landscape of Turkey has 
shared same conditions. However, just there are similarities between Turkey and 
proximate nations such as Greece, Portugal and Spain so there are a number of key 
differences. Most obvious differences between these countries, Turkey, unlike the 
southern European neighbours, is not a member of the European Union. In this 
context, as observed in Turkey’s neighbours experiment, the rapid developments in 
the democracies and the national economies were linked directly to the European 
accession1. As Nikos Leandros (2010, p. 900) has pointed out; “following 
infringement procedures by the European Commission, the Greek government was 
forced to abolish conditions that excluded the owners of media companies from 
public procurement”. In this context, Turkey’s membership of the European Union 
together with the realization of the gains may be important in the context of 
ensuring media pluralism and democratic communication order could be observed. 
Where the Turkish case can add to our understanding of regional media systems 
and development, therefore is in a comparison between the transitions from 
                                                          
1
 As Christian Christensen (2007, p. 196) have emphasised, it is noteworthy that membership of the 
European Union for Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986) came only 7 in the case of 
Greece, 11 Spain and 12 Portugal years after their respective military / authoritarian regimes ended.   
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authoritarian regimes to European Union membership that have taken place in 
countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, and the ongoing developments in the 
Turkish media and socio-political arena (Christensen, 2007, p. 197). In this regard, 
it would be interesting to ask, how does freedom of media pluralism regulation 
originating in the Athens stand-up “vis-a-vis” those originating from Ankara. In the 
context of media pluralism and democratic communication order that a same 
question, the media and the democratization of international consideration of the 
establishment of a pluralistic structure reminiscent of that will be an important 
stopover. 
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